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Abstract 
This paper presents a plausible reasoning sys­
tem to illustrate some broad issues in knowl­
edge representation: dualities between dif­
ferent reasoning forms, the difficulty of uni­
fying complementary reasoning styles, and 
the approximate nature of plausible reason­
ing. These issues have a common underly­
ing theme: there should be an underlying 
belief calculus of which the many different 
reasoning forms are special cases, sometimes 
approximate. The system presented allows 
reasoning about defaults, likelihood, neces­
sity and possibility in a manner similar to the 
earlier work of Adams. The system is based 
on the belief calculus of subjective Bayesian 
probability which itself is based on a few 
simple assumptions about how belief should 
be manipulated. Approximations, semantics, 
consistency and consequence results are pre­
sented for the system. While this puts these 
often discussed plausible reasoning forms on 
a probabilistic footing, useful application to 
practical problems remains an issue. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There are many styles of knowledge representation and 
inference involving some form of uncertainty or incon­
sistency: reasoning about likelihoods, independence 
and related notions such as causality, confirmation, 
defaults and statistical frequencies, and tasks such as 
analogy, abduction and belief revision. In knowledge 
representation there is now a recognised need for the 
unification and development of these multiple, comple­
mentary forms of reasoning (Brachman, 1990). To do 
this unification an underlying belief calculus is needed 
as a common base for the different reasoning forms. 
First, this paper presents a system unifying defaults, 
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likelihood, necessity and possibility. Because the sys­
tem uses Bayesian probability as the underlying belief 
calculus, independence, abduction, belief revision and 
many other facets of plausible reasoning could be inte­
grated as well, although it is not done so here. Second 
this paper argues that plausible reasoning can be inter­
preted as a form of approximate reasoning. This has 
important implications to the implementation of plau­
sible reasoning systems. For instance, error can accu­
mulate in a long chain of plausible reasoning, so po­
tential error should be tracked. So this paper also dis­
cusses approximate methods for tracking error. Also, 
we cannot expect plausible reasoning to be correct ev­
ery time. Many of the so-called paradoxes in plausible 
reasoning arise because it is assumed that plausible 
reasoning will always lead to a correct conclusion. 
The system presented here, like most Bayesian meth­
ods, is based on a few basic assumptions together with 
a few approximations. The assumptions are about how 
belief can be modelled and updated and have been pre­
sented in (Horvitz et a!., 1986). The same Bayesian 
principles have led to the development of algorithms 
for learning (Buntine, 1991a), uncertain inference, and 
many more applications outside of artificial intelli­
gence. Bayesian methods arc claimed to be normative, 
which means they set a standard for plausible rc<cson­
ing and implies they will not suffer from the standard 
paradoxes that arc discussed in the non-monotonic lit­
erature (Hanks and McDermott, 1987; Poole, 1989; 
Pearl, 1988; Etherington ct a!., 1990). (Treatment 
of several paradoxes are given here and in (Buntinc, 
1001 b).) The system presented here only implcmcn ts 
one facet of the Bayesian approach and therefore is in­
complete and may require extending with one of many 
complementary modes of normative reasoning, such 
as the making of default assumptions about indepen­
dence (Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1900b). 
The next section informally introduces the notation for 
a qualitative and a quantitative logic that each demon­
strate a different level of approximation for reasoning 
about defaults and likelihoods. The default compo­
nent of the qualitative logic corresponds to the var-
ious conditional logics developed for default reason­
ing (Delgrande, 1988; Pearl, 1988; Geffner, 1988) but 
most closely to Adams' improper conditional (Adams, 
1966). The quantitative logic has its roots in remarks 
made by Adams. The qualitative system is presented 
here only for contrast with the quantitative system, 
because the quantitative system has many advantages 
with little extra overhead. The third section cov­
ers the theory of the two systems, semantics, con­
sistency and consequence. Since the qualitative logic 
is an extension of Adams conditional logic (Adams, 
1%6; Adams, 1975), applied to default reasoning by 
Geffner and Pearl (Pearl, 1988; Geffner, 1988), this 
greatly extends and simplifies Adams' and Goldszmidt 
and Pearl's (Goldszmidt and Pearl, 1990a) consistency 
and consequence tests by incorporating necessity, pos­
sibility, and likelihood in a quantitative framework. 
The quantitative framework allows approximate de­
fault and likelihood reasoning and tracking of accumu­
lated error at the same time. The fourth section illus­
trates the use of the logics on some standard problems 
from the literature. The fifth section uses the logics to 
illustrate some major properties of plausible reasoning. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to cover the basic 
notions of probability and decision theory underlying 
subsequent sections. Suitable introductions from an 
AI perspective can be found in (Langlotz and Short­
liffc, 1989; Horvitz et a!. , 1988; Pearl, 1988). 
2 NOTATION 
DP is a propositionaJl logic annotated with proba­
bility bounds, and has a probabilistic rather than a 
possible world semantics. This allows inequality rea­
soning as an approxilnation to nonnative reasoning 
about point probabilities. QDP drops the numeric 
subscripts from DP and is designed to be a qualita­
tive counterpart of DP. It is intended to be an ap­
proximation to DP for reasoning about "small" but 
not infinitesimal probabilities. The semantics of QDP 
complements DP and is based on order of magnitude 
reasoning, but also has an infinitesimal semantics sim­
ilar to Adams' conditional logic. 
DP is built on the language Dp that is constructed 
from the propositional language together with four 
modal operators: the unary connectives D (necessity), 
o (possibility), and the binary connectives =? (de­
fault with error bound) and � (likelihood with lower 
bound). There is no nesting of these operators. The 
operators can be interpreted as follows. (Delow A and 
D both represent arbitrary propositions.) 
1 Although propositional sentences are dealt with 
throughout, pseudo-first-order sentences will sometimes be 
used. They arc effectively propositional if there are known 
to be a finite number of constants, no quantifiers arc al­
lowed, and a sentence with variables is intended to repre­
sent a. sentence scltcma. 
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DA: A is necessarily true in any situation. 
oA: Some situation can possibly arise in which A is 
true. 
A =?, D: Given that you know just A about the 
current situation, you can infer D by default (with 
error in belief at most €) . 
A �. D: Given that you know just A about the 
current situation, D is at least likely (with belief 
no less than e) . 
These four operators are joined using the standard 
boolean connectives ( � (negation), -+ (conditional), 
II (conjunction), etc.) to form the language Dp. This 
language also has a qualitative version, QDp, which 
has the numeric subscripts dropped. The semantics 
for the language implements this by making € and e 
infinitesimal; not because we believe them to be in­
finitesimal but as a mathematical abstraction to ob­
tain approximate behaviour of the operators for £ and 
e small. Q D p has successively weaker forms of the 
likelihood operator. A� D denotes "likely," whereas 
A �2 D would denote "barely likely," etc. This is 
related to the iterated likelihood operator found in 
(Halpern and Rabin, 1987) and has a formal justifi­
cation in Theorem 3 part 2. 
A �" D: Given that you know just A about the 
current situation, D is at least likely to be . . .  to 
be likely (to order n). 
The default and likelihood operators are "improper" 
according to Adams' terminology (Adams, 1966). This 
means A =? D and A � D will both hold true if A is 
necessarily false . The "proper" versions must have A 
being possible, so correspond to oA II (A =? D), and 
oA II (A� D) respectively. 
The logics, being probabilistically based, arc eas­
ily able to express sentences such as "an Aus­
tralian is likely to drink Foster's": Aust·ralian "" 
>- Drinks-Foster's; whereas Aust7·al ian �2 
Drinks -another-Foster's expresses the fact that, at 
least occasionly, an Australian will drink even more 
Foster's. Surprisingly enough, they also able to express 
sentences more in the spirit of autoepistemic (Moore, 
1985) and default logics (Reiter, 1980). We can in­
terpret the sentence "a professor has a Ph.D. unless 
known otherwise" two ways: 
o(Prof(x) II Phd(x)) ----> (Prof(x) =? Phd(x)), 
o(Prof(x) II Phd(x)) ----> D(Prof(x)-+ Phd(x)). 
Read as "if it is possible that a particnlar profes­
sor has a PhD, then the professor most l-ikely has a 
Ph.D.,"  and "if it is possible that a particular pro­
fessor has a PhD, then the professor definitely has a 
Ph.D." respectively. The default logic representation, 
from P.rof(x) II M Phd(x) infer Phd(x), corresponds 
to the second reading. So the possibility operator, "o", 
behaves rather like the /'.1 operator of default logic. 
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3 THEORY 
This section presents the semantics for the two logics 
and then discusses their intended use in plausible rea­
soning. Basic consistency and consequence theorems 
are given. 
3.1 SEMANTICS 
In DP, "I=Pr D" denotes that DE Dp is true for the 
probability distribution Pr. Pr plays a role not unlike 
an interpretation in standard propositional logic. 
Definition 1 Given a probability distribution Pr on 
propositions, "I= Pr " is defined on sentences from D p 
as follows. 
1. I=Pr DA if and only if Pr(A) = 1. 
2. I=Pr A=?, B if and only if Pr(BIA) 2: 1- €. 
3. I=Pr -.D if and only if not FPr D. 
.{. I=Pr D--> E if and only if not I=Pr D or FPr E. 
Possibility and likelihood are by definition dual opera­
tors for necessity and default respectively. "oA" is de­
fined as "-.0-.A", so FPr oA if and only if Pr(A) > 0. 
"A :::::>-e B" is defined as "-.(A =?e -.B)", so A :::::>-e B 
if and only if Pr (BIA) > e. 
Definition 2 A sentence D E Dp is a theorem of 
the probabiz.istic logic DP if I=Pr D for all zwssible 
proba.bil-ity distrib·ui'ions Pr. 
Consistency and consequence for sentences are defined 
in the usual manner based on the notion of a theorem. 
To obtain qualitative rules about default and likeli­
hood from the quantitative rules in DP, we can per­
form order of magnitude reasoning. We can consider 
a representative default error, €1 where € might be less 
than 0.01, or whatever the decision context requires. 
Likewise, we can consider a representative default like­
lihood, e, where e might be greater than 0.05, say. In 
order to approximate the behaviour of our reasoning 
with these particular limits in mind, we can parame­
terise the system by € and e and consider only approx­
imate calculations to 0(€) and O(e). QDp is defined 
in a manner such that € and e are arbitrarily small, 
but € is also arbitrarily smaller than e. 
Definition 3 A sentenceD E QDp is a theorem of 
the qualitative probabilistic logic QP D if there exists a 
theorem D' E Dp corresponding to D (that is, iden­
tical except for any super or s·ubscripts), in which all 
s·ubscripts to "=;." and ":::::>- " aTe parameterised by some 
variables € and e and each subscript to "=;." is of order 
€ as € approaches 0 and e remains finite, and each sub­
script in D' corresponding to ":::::>-n" in D is of order 
e" as e and� approach 0. Th-is is denoted "I=QDP D". 
Again, consistency and consequence are defined in the 
usual manner. 
This definition can be reinterpreted to give an infinites­
imal semantics close to that of Adams. Lemma 1 below 
(Buntine, 1991b) does this using a standard clausal 
form for defaults and another for likelihoods that col­
lects all necessities and possibilities into the left-hand 
side of the clause. 
Lemma 1 
FQDP DU 1\iEivoV;!\;EIAA; =? B; --> V;ErcGi =? H;, 
if and only if there exists a 6 and 1) such that for all 
€ < 1) 
FDP DU 1\iEiv oV; 1\;EfA A; =?, B; --> 
V;ErcGi =?6, H; 
Similarly, 
I=QDP DU 1\iEiv oV; 1\;EfA A; :::::>-n' B; --> 
ViEicGi �mi H i , 
if and only if there exists a 6 and 17 such that for a.ll 
€ < 1) 
I=DP DU 1\;Efv ov; 1\;EfA A; :::::>-, .. , B; --> 
ViEicGi ::::>-o€mi H i . 
For the D p sentences in the lemma, 6 is an error prop­
agation factor, and 0€ and OE"'' are the error propaga­
tion functions respectively. For the default clause, the 
larger the value of 6, the faster error can propagate 
when the clause is applied in some chain of reason­
ing. Since a smaller likelihood represents more room 
for error, in the likelihood clause the smaller the value 
of 6, the faster error will propagate when the clause is 
applied in some chain of reasoning. 
For instance, the sentence 
(A:::::>-, C) 1\ (B :::::>-d C) --> A VB :::::>-t C, 
is a theorem of DP with the error propagation function 
f given by 
ed 
f < :::; min(e, d ). 
e + d- ed 
Therefore we can drop the subscripts to get a Q D P 
theorem as well. 
3.2 THEOREMS 
DP and QDP give a system for reasoning qualita­
tively and quantitatively about probability inequal­
ities. However, normative reasoning according to 
Bayesian principles is based on point probabilities. Of­
ten in normative reasoning, we have a specific deci­
sion context in mind and we wish to determine if the 
probability of some proposition is less than or greater 
than some fixed probability (determined by the loss 
function) . DP and QDP are then approximations for 
dealing with this special case. QDP is merely an ab­
straction of DP given here to show the connection of 
DP with existing conditional and probabilistically mo­
tivated logics. Because of the inability of QDP to keep 
track of error, it would be a potentially unsafe system 
to use in practice. 
If the problem contains a good deal of uncertainty so 
the errors are large, or the loss function for the deci­
sions to be made requires careful evaluation of com­
parative probabilities, it may be more appropriate to 
conduct a careful probabilistic analysis instead of us­
ing the approximate methods suggested here. If how­
ever, the errors are small, it is shown in this section we 
can do consistency and consequence tests in D P us­
ing qualitative reasoning about defaults and likelihood, 
and follow this with some simple error propagation cal­
culations to calculate upper bounds on propagated er­
rors. These approximate probability calculations may 
then be a sufficient basis for making decisions. Details 
of this approach arc described in this section. This 
makes DP a safe alternative to QDP when approxi­
mate reasoning seems appropriate. 
Notice though that whether a sentence from Dp is con­
sistent or is a consequence of some other can be con­
verted to a set of simplex problems in the variables, 
as done with Probabilistic Logic (Nilsson, 1986) . We 
shall not pursue this approach, however, since we are 
concerned with approximate modelling of default and 
likelihood reasoning, for which "propagation errors" 
can be calculated rapidly using other more approxi­
mate means, as shown below. 
Algorithms for consistency and consequence are given 
here for the numerically annotated logic DP. To ob­
tain results for QDP, simply drop the subscripts, and 
in the case of likelihoods, be careful to check the or­
ders of magnitude of the error propagation functions. 
Since each of the theorems below allows arbitrary pos­
sibilities to be included, the algorithms can be readily 
converted to the proper versions of the operators. 
The algorithms rely on first computing the subset 
of the default (likelihood) operators that must have 
their antecedents necessarily false. For instance, in 
(A =?B) A (A=? �B) A (C =? D), A must be neces­
sarily false since both B and �n cannot be "typical" 
at the same time. So both the first two defaults must 
have their antecedents necessarily false. These com­
puted subsets for defaults (likelihoods) are referred to 
as the maximum (minimum) inconsistent set. An al­
gorithm for computing the maximum inconsistent set 
of a DP sentence with defaults is given in Figure 1. 
The algorithm for computing the minimum inconsis­
tent set for a DP sentence containing no defaults is 
given in Figure 2. Logical tests for consistency and 
consequence arc given in Theorem 2 for Dp clauses 
containing no likelihood operator. The role of the max­
imum inconsistent set can best be seen by looking at 
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Input: A Dp sentence DU 1\iElv oV; 1\;EfA A;=:-,. 
Bi, where €i < d.4r, �fori E IA. 
Output: The maxinnun inconsistent set, lmax· 
Algorithm: Let I = IA. If there exists a j E I 
such that U 1\ Aj 1\iEI (A; -> B;) is satisfiable, 
then remove that j from I. Repeat this until no 
j found or I= 0. Ima• is then given by I. 
Figure 1: The defaults-inconsistency algorithm 
Input: A Dp sentence DU 1\iElv oV; 1\iEIA A; *'• 
B;, where e; < � fori E IA. 
Output: The minimum i nconsistent set, I min. 
Algorithm: Let I = 0. If there exists a j E IA- I 
such that U 1\;ei �A; 1\ Aj 1\ Bj is unsatisfiable, 
then add that j to I and repeat until no j found. 
lmin is now given by I. 
Figure 2: The likelihood-inconsistency algorithm 
parts 1 and 4 of the theorem. 
Theorem 2 Consider the D p sentence D given by 
DU A;uv oV; A;uA A; =?,  B;, where E; < 1},1, t 
for i E IA. Let I max denote the (unique) maximum 
inconsistent set for the sentence. 
1. The sentence D is inconsistent if and only if there 
exists some j E Iv such that U A Vj A;um .. -.A; 
is unsatisfiable. 
2. The Dp sentence C =?8 B is a consequence of D 
for some o < � if and only if D A (C =?6 �B) 
i8 inconsistent.- 8 = I;iEIA E; ·is a correct error 
propagation function. 
3. The Dp sentence oC is a consequence of D if and 
only -if D A o�c is inconsistent. 
4. The Dp sentence DC is a consequence of D if 
and only if D itself is inconsistent or I= U A; Elm .. 
�A;_, C. 
Notice by part 1, if the DP sentence contains proper 
default operators (so possibilities are included) , then 
the sentence will necessarily be inconsistent if the max­
imum inconsistent set is non-empty. The correspond­
ing property applies to likelihoods. 
Tests for consistency and consequence using the like­
lihood operator arc given in Theorem 3. Methods for 
computing tighter bounds for the error propagation 
function, linear in some cases, arc given in (Buntinc, 
1991b). 
Theorem 3 Consider the Dp sentence D gi-ven by 
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DU 1\iElv oV; /\;erA A; �e; B;, where e; < JtT 
for i E IA. Let Imin denote the (unique) minimum 
inconsistent set. 
1. The sentence D is inconsistent if and only if there 
exists some j E Iv such that U A;er .. ;. �A; A Vj 
is unsatisfiable. 
2. The Dp sentence C �� B is a consequence of D 
for some f < 1 if and only if D is inconsistent 
or the likelihood inconsistency algorithm in Fig­
ure 3 terminates yielding a consequence. If con­
sequence holds, then a lower bound on f ,  the error 
( ) II AI 
propagation function, is given by f � 1�. , 
where e = min;ElA e;, although the error propaga­
tion function can be less, for instance, linear in 
the e; in some cases. 
3. The D p sentence oC is a consequence of D -if and 
only if D A o�c is inconsistent. 
4. The Dp sentence DC is a consequence of D if and 
only if D is inconsistent or I= U 1\;EJ .. ;. �A; __. 
c. 
Input: A consistent Dp sentence DU 1\;ervoV;/\;erA 
A; *'ei B;, where Ci < rf4T for i E IA, its 
miniinun1 inconsistent set I min, and a likelihood 
c�1D. 
Output: Whether the likelihood is a consequence of 
the sentence for some value of f. 
Algorithm: If U 1\;El.,;. �A; 1\ C 1\ �n is unsatisfi­
able, return is a consequence for any f. Set I= 0. 
If there exists some j E IA -Imin -I such that 
I= U 1\iEimin -.A; 1\ Aj 1\ Bj 1\iEI (A; --+ fl;) 
-+ CAB 
then add that j to I. Otherwise return not a 
consequence. Repeat this process until U 1\iElmin 
�A; 1\ C 1\ �n 1\;El A; is unsatisfiable or I= IA­
I min. If tcnnination occurred because I = I A -
Imin, return not a consequence, else return zs a 
consequence for son1e f. 
Figure 3: The likelihood-consequence algorithm 
Also, (A � B) __. �(A=> �n) is a theorem of QDP. 
This property can be used, for instance, to convert 
a QDP formula containing a mixture of defaults and 
likelihoods into a stronger formula containing just de­
faults, and so prove consistency of the weaker formula. 
4 EXAMPLES 
The logics are illustrated here on some standard para­
doxes from the knowledge representation literature. 
Others handled are the "Yale shooting problem" and 
"Can Joe read and write?" (Buntine, 1991b). 
4.1 THE LOTTERY PARADOX 
Suppose a lottery has 1, 000,000 participants. The 
following two sentences are theorems of DP. The first 
follows from Theorem 2, and the second is its dual 
constructed by converting defaults to likelihoods and 
rearranging: 
1,000,000 
1\ (t1·ue =>, (person i wont win lottery)) --+ 
i:::::l 
(t1·ue =?1,ooo,ooo., (no-one will win lottery)) , 
with its dual, 
(true �' (someone will win lottery)) --+ 
1,000,000 
V (t1·ue �--' (person i will win lottery)) . 1,000,000 
i:::::l 
Moreover, replacing 1, 000, 000 by 999, 999 yields sen­
tences that are not theorems of Q D P. Ignoring the 
error bounds as done in QDP, the first sentence would 
seem to read "if, by default, any particular person will 
not win the lottery, then, by default, no-one will win 
the lottery at all". Likewise, the second DP sentence 
would seem to read: "if it is likely that someone will 
win the lottery, then for some lottery entrant, it is 
likely they will win the lottery" (clearly not the case 
before the draw). 
The two readings arc versions of the lottery paradox 
that arc the dual of each other. In the first DP sen­
tence the natural value for £ is 1 00� 000; this leaves 
the sentence impotent because the' err�r bound in the 
conclusion becomes 1. In DP there is no paradoxi­
cal reading. QDP unfortunately drops the subscripts 
(both are of order £ as £ approaches 0) and loses the 
error information. QDP suffers from the lottery para­
dox because it disregards the approximate nature of 
the default and likelihood operators. In the first sen­
tence above, taking the conjunction of one million dif­
ferent approximate statements leads to an incorrect 
statement because the error in each accumulates. 
Because of the cheap cost of maintaining approximate 
error calculations, as demonstrated in Theorem 3 for 
DP, there would seem little reason for using a purely 
qualitative system such as QDP. 
4.2 THE "VANISHING" EMUS 
The modelling of default reasoning based on infinites­
imal probabilities has been criticised on the grounds 
that it makes "subclasses vanish" (Neufeld ct al., 1990, 
pl23). Etherington, Kraus and Perlis (Etherington 
et al., 1990) show a related problem applies to defanlt 
logic and circumscription. 
Consider the following rules: 
Emu(x)--> Bird(x) , 
Emu(x) => -.Flies(x) , 
Bird(x) => Flies(x) . 
We can conclude (using Theorem 2) that "typically, 
birds aren't emus", Bird(x) => -.Emu(x), and "typi­
cally, things aren't emus", true=> -.Emu(x). 
If we take the infinitesimal semantics of the default op­
erator literally then we could conclude that "no birds 
are emus", or "nothing is an emu". The real intent of 
the probabilistic semantics presented here, however, is 
about approximations so a more correct reading of the 
conclusion is that the emu is an uncommon or non­
typical bird, which in reality is true of emus. 
Circumscription, when presented with this same prob­
lem will deduce there are no emus to minimise the 
exceptions (Etherington et a!., 1990). Etherington, 
Kraus and Perlis invent the notion of scope to over­
come the same kind of difficulties in default logics and 
circumscription (Etherington et a!., 1990): 
We contend that the intention of default rea­
soning is generally not to determine the prop­
erties of every individual in the domain, but 
rather those of some particular individuals of 
interest. 
QDP resolves the same paradoxes using a related prin­
ciple that falls out naturally from the Bayesian frame­
work and can be stated as follows: 
The intention of default rea.soning is gener­
ally to determine rea.sonable properties of an 
individual in the domain. While these may 
be reasonable individually, they are not nec­
essarily correct so one cannot rea.sonably say 
they apply uniformly. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The systems presented here do not do full norma­
tive Bayesian reasoning but instead are approxima­
tions valid in certain situations (as explained at the 
beginning of Section 3.2). Approximations have two 
effects: they can make a system incomplete or incor­
rect. DP has retained correctness but become incom­
plete. In QDP correctness is also lost by doing order 
of magnitude reasoning. One result of incompleteness 
is that on many general problems these systems will 
need complementary rea.soning forms in order to pro­
duce a result. A result of incorrectness is that errors in 
reasoning can creep in, especially when they are hid­
den in qualitative reasoning which has a logical form 
making it appear deceptively accurate. As shown with 
the examples, both these results are a source of ma­
terial for paradoxes if the underlying approximations 
arc not understood. 
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This section discusses the issues raised by this: unify­
ing complementary reasoning forms, the nature of ap­
proximate reasoning, and the dualities between default 
and likelihood reasoning. These insights, together with 
Theorems 2 and 3 form the major contributions of this 
paper. This gives us a much deeper insight into the 
problems of knowledge representation and inference in­
volving some form of uncertainty. 
5.1 DUALITIES 
One of the first things taught to students of logic 
is the duality between disjunction and conjunction 
(-.(AI\ B) <--> (-.Av-.B) and ·(AV B)<--> (-.Af\-.B)). 
In modal logic, duality also holds between necessity 
and possibility (DA <--> -, o -.A and oA <--> -.0-,A). 
In DP the corresponding duality applies between de­
fault and likelihood. This means, for instance, that 
we can obtain dual forms for all DP theorems and 
to a limited degree some QDP theorems (the QDP 
definitions are only approximately dual) by converting 
defaults to likelihoods and vice versa. Versions of some 
QDP theorems and their (rearranged) duals are given 
in Table 1. 
1 (C =>A) 1\ (C =>-.A) _, o-.c 
2 (C=>A) 1\ (C=>B)--> C=>(AI\B) 
3 (C =>A) ---+ (C /\A=> B) ---+ (C =>B) 
4 (A VB) => C --> (A=> C) V (B =>C) 
1 oC ---+ (C �A) v (C �·A) 
2 C �(A VB) ---+ (C �A) V (C �B) 
3 (C�B) _, (C�A) V (CI\A�B) 
4 (A� C) 1\ (B � C) _, (A VB) � C 
Table 1: Some theorem schemata (1st table) and their 
duals (2nd) 
These duality properties come about because of the ba­
sic properties of negation and by the dual definitions 
for the operators. A more remarkable but not so exact 
duality can be seen in the consistency and consequence 
theorems for default and likelihood. Compare the al­
gorithms for the maximum and minimum inconsistent 
sets, and compare each of the results in Theorems 2 
and 3. These theorems are not duals according to the 
definition of default and likelihood. For instance, the 
dual results to Theorem 2 would show a disjunction 
of likelihoods can be a consequence of a single like­
lihood rather than show a single likelihood can be a 
consequence of a conjunction of likelihoods, the situ­
ation of Theorem 3. The theorems are proven using 
quite different methods (for instance the results for 
likelihood are considerably harder to prove than those 
for default). Yet the theorems and algorithms have 
a remarkably similar form. Their major difference is 
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that error combines slowly (linearly) for defaults but 
rapidly (multiplicatively) for likelihoods, though lin­
early in some special cases (Buntine, 1991b). Because 
likelihood errors combine rapidly, people often keep 
track of the degree of likelihood. For instance, like­
lihoods are used to rank order hypotheses in model­
based diagnosis and abduction. Another result of this 
difference is that while considerable research has fo­
cussed on default reasoning, none to date has consid­
ered variable strength defaults as for instance allowed 
using error propagation functions and Theorem 2. In 
contrast, likelihood reasoning systems suggested in the 
literature introduced qualitative variable strength like­
lihoods from the beginning (Halpern and Rabin, 1987). 
5.2 UNIFYING COMPLEMENTARY 
REASONING FORMS 
The treatment of the two paradoxes "Can joe read 
and write?" and the Yale shooting problem are an 
example of how independence becomes an important 
complementary reasoning form for conditional logics. 
Both these problems yield no paradox in Q D P, N P 
(Delgrande, 1988) and related conditional logics be­
cause no default conclusions can be made at all. This 
holds because the antecedents of a conditional default 
or likelihood rule cannot be arbitrarily specialised with 
some additional knowledge. That is, the QDp sen­
tence (B => C) -> (A 1\ B => C) is not a theorem of 
QDP. For instance, the often useful transitive rela­
tion (A=> B) 1\ (B =>C) -> A=> C is not a theorem 
of QDP. However, the QDp sentence 
((B =>C)-> (A 1\ B =>C)) -+ 
((A=> B) 1\ (B =>C) ->A=> C) 
is a theorem of QDP. This means knowledge of the 
form (B => C) -> (A 1\ B => C) will play a vital 
role in enabling default and likelihood conclusions like 
transitivity. If A is independent of C given B then we 
have this knowledge. 
Given that we need complementary reasoning forms, 
how do we unify them? It would be nice if we could 
somehow keep the different reasoning styles in sepa­
rate modules, as suggested in hybrid reasoning sys­
tems (Frisch and Cohn, 1991). However, experience 
gained in the exercise here indicates this may not usu­
ally be possible. The unifying of necessity and possi­
bility reasoning with default reasoning and likelihood 
reasoning, as presented in Theorems 2 and 3, required 
careful integration of the several approaches. Another 
unification that needs to be made is to integrate sym­
bolic reasoning about independence (Lauritzen et a!., 
1990; Pearl, 1988) into the algorithms presented in 
Theorems 2 and 3. 
5.3 APPROXIMATE REASONING 
Qualitative reasoning about default and likelihood is 
interpreted here as an approximate form of reason­
ing that is bound to sometimes produce incorrect re­
sults. By investigating the quantitative counterpart to 
these reasoning forms, we are able to see more closely 
how this error propagates and accumulates and how 
we might track it, and we are able to better under­
stand the assumptions under which the system oper­
ates. A qualitative system, for instance, has an im­
plicit assumption that all errors € are identical. With 
the quantitative system, however, we are able to allow 
the errors to vary-a more realistic situation. 
Of course, all these rough approximations could be 
circumvented if we would adhere to more complete, 
fully normative Bayesian reasoning in the first place. 
This raises the important question: When do approx­
imate systems such as DP buy us improved perfor­
mance in an application over more complete proba­
bilistic approaches? Comparative studies here do not 
exist. Approximate systems such as DP could be ap­
propriate for generating a comprehensible explanation 
of probabilistic results obtained, for instance, by other 
numeric methods. Also, approximate systems due to 
their more simplistic framework, may be more appro­
priate for rapid turn-around in system development 
and user training. They may therefore serve as a use­
ful complement to a more complete probabilistic ap­
proach rather than as a replacement. Only application 
experience will tell. 
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